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Abstract
We study the welfare effects ofcombining the European Commission's proposal
for VAT hannonization with different degrees of weakening of the 'quotient
familial',afeature ofthe French systemofdirecttaxation which canbeinterpreted
as aiming at taxing 'equivalised' household income. We compare two approaches
to the calibration of the baseline situation and to the simulation of reactions to
changes in the tax system. One of these takes fixed costs of work into account.
For both we find that a tentative implementation of the Commission's proposal,
keeping the low rate unchanged, is favourable to a narrow majority (the status quo
is preferred on a numberofcriteria), but that it results in ahigh VATrate inexcess
ofthe proposal. While a weakening ofthe quotient f~milial brings this rate within
the desired bracket, the combined refonn appears much less desirable than the
pure VAT refonn. ThiS goes some way againstthe notion thatthequotientfamilial
constitutes a tax relief which is only significant for richer households. "
Acknowledgements
Support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. from the Zentrum fUr Europilische Wirtschaftsforschung
Mannheim (ZEW) and from the SPES project 'The Indirect Taxation of European Households' is gratefully
acknowledged. Thorsten Geib provided excellent research assistance. We wish to thank participants to seminars
in Heidelberg. Mannheim. Santander and Venice for helpful comments and discussions.1 Introduction
Several considerations motivated this study. Firstly, Baccouche and Laisney
(1990) found the VAT hannonization proposal of the European Commission
(move to a structure with two rates only, in the intervals 6.5%±2.5% and
16.5%±2.5%) to be extremely unfavourable for most French households. This is
in line with the conclusions of Lee et a1. (1988) for the U.K., but still, the extent
of the phenomenon made us wish to reconsider some of the more doubtful
assumptions in the Baccouche and Laisney study. These concerned mainly a
dissymmetry in the treatment of VAT rates before and after hannonization, the
latter being much more approximative. Thus in this study we adoptthe samelevel
of precision'on VAT rates before and after the refonn.
Secondly, the same study indicated that a revenue-neutral implementation of the
Commission'sproposalwouldrequireincreasingboththelowandtheintermediate
rate in the prevailingthree rate structure. This prompted us to tryand combinethat
refonnwitharevenue-increasingrefonnofthe systemofdirecttaxation. Anyway,
given the discrepancies in the relative importance ofdirect and indirect taxation
inEurope, it appearsdifficulttodiscusshannonizationofindirecttaxesinisolation
from other aspects of the tax systems. The Economist (1991) gives an easily
accessible account of the peculiarities of the French tax system.
Thirdly, besides the system of social security contributions, a good candidate for
reforn1. examination seems to be the systemof 'quotientfamilial', which basically
takes the number of dependent children into account in order to assess the tax
liability per 'equivalent adult' in the household. Among OECD countries, that
system is specific to France and has often been criticized as a regressive aspect of
the tax system: such atax reliefwill apparentlyprimarily benefitwealthyfamilies
(see e.g. Atkinson et aI., 1988, p. 136). On the otherhand, that systemcan be seen
as an attempt at assessing tax on a measure of the cost of living rather than on
income per se (Conseil des ImpOts, 1990, p. 230). We will thus look at the effects




needed. The studies we are aware of are limited in scope: Atkinson et al. (1980)
consider male labour supply and take account of reactions over a very narrow
range of hours only; Blundell et a1. (1986) concentrate mainly on female labour
supply; Atkinson et a1. (1988) considerthe institutional framework in greatdetail,
1butdonot allowforreactionsofthe households to variations in the taxparameters.
By contrast, we will even be able, in principle, to describe the impact of relative
and absolute price changes on labour supply.
Forthesimulationwe willrelyonestimatesforacompletesystemoffemale labour
supply and demands for goods estimated on a sample of households based on a
married couple. The nature of this selection also contributes to the choice of the
kind of reform studied here. For instance, a reform of the system of social con-
tributionswouldinducelaboursupplyand demandforgoodsreactionsofsegments
of the population for which we have not yet estimated preference parameters
Ourapproachwill also remain fairly rudimentary, but as we go along we pointout
different importantproblems which arise from the joipt treatment ofdemands for
goods C;lnd labour supply and which should be tackled_.in detail if we want our
models to be realistic. One such problem is that of the fixed costs of work, which
have an impact on the participation decision, and vary when indirect taxes are
modified.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we give the theoretical setting,
Section3presentstheoutlineofthesimulationmethodadopted,Section4discusses
the details of the reforms we are interested in, and Section 5 comments the
simulationresults, concentrating mainlyongraphicalevidence, whereastables are
mostlydeferredtoan Appendix. AppendixAgivesthe detailsofthe two strategies
followed for calibrating the baseline situation. One ofthem entails the calibration
offixed costs ofwork, obtainedfrom the estimated preferenceparametersin order
to bring the model predictions in line with the observed baseline situation.
Appendix B gives some information on the elasticities implied by the estimates
underlying our simulations. Appendix C gives more extensive results on the
simulation than we deem reasonable to include in the body of the text.
2 Theoretical setting
We work in a partial equilibriumframework, using life cycle consistent e~timates
of preferences derived from household demands and female laboursupply under
the assuptions of inter-temporal separability and weak separability between male
hoursand all otherdemands, includingfemale leisure. Wetreatmale laboursupply
as fixed (i.e. constrained for all men in the sample). Welfare changes affecting
2each household are thus fully described in terms of the sub-utility function
excluding male labour supply. Up to this point, estimated parameters concerning
the commodity demands could be interpreted as resulting from a fairly general
Gorman polar form with weak separability between female labour supply and
commodity demands, leading to linear Engel curves.
l We now go a step further
in identifying the linearexpenditure system, augmentedfor female laboursupply,
from the estimated parameters.
The household maximizes the corresponding utility function
n
U (h,q) =f30 In (Yo - h)+ L (3)n(qi - y),
i=l
(1)
where h are hours, q is a vector of demands for goods, Yo denotes the maximum
time available for allocation between leisure and work, Yi is the minimum con-




e: =p.q =m +wh,
(2)
(3)
where w denotes the marginal wage rate, m denotes net virtual unearned income
and T female time endowment. Thi~ yields the earnings equation
wh = wYo(l- (30) +f3o(P'Y - m)
and the demand equations
f3i
P,.qi =PiYi +0-(30) (m +wh - P .y).
Using duality and defining:









a (P) =p.yand b (p) = IT ~
;= 1 /3;
. - /3;
, wIth /3; =1-130' (7)
we. can rewrite (1) as:
U(h ,q)=/30 In (Yo-h)+ (l-/3o)V(p,e)=:W(p,k,e)
=13010(Yo - h)+n-I3o{lo(e;d) + i~l ~i 10~,J. (8)
with
n ~i
d:=p.y and P:= IT p; .
;=1
Comparisonof(1) and (8) showshowwecantakeadvantageoftwostagebudgeting
bothinestimation and in simulation. Estimation results of (4) and (5) are reported
in Blundell et a1. (1989). The mean of the estimated labour supply elasticities is
1.0. The estimation procedure takes the existence of job seekers into account and
uses grouped hours information rather than relying on the identity between
observed and desired hours. In our opinion, the main defect of our labour supply
model is that it does not account for fixed costs of work for the non-participants,
whether or not they seek work, whereas the costs of work are included in the
expenditures of the participants. The estimation of the demand equations takes
care of the problem ofzero expenditures recurrent in micro data in the following
way: For alcohol and tobacco, we assume that purchases coincide with con-
sumption and that households reporting zero expenditures do not consume these
goods. Four different regimes of consumption will result from the four
corresponding patterns (tobacco: yes/no, alcohol: yes/no). Forthe othergoods we
assume that zero expenditures are generated by the 'infrequency of purchase'
model. AppendixB showshistograms ofthe corresponding purchase probabilities
and the means ofthe expenditure elasticities in the four regimes. The assumption
ofweakseparabilitybetweenleisureandgoodswastestedforeachgoodseparately,
and rejected onlyfor food and for transport-and-communication.
43 Simula~ion method
Wefirstdeterminethetaxrevenueinthe referencesituation, afterhavingcalibrated
the preferences as described in Appendix A. The calibration is done in order to
bring the estimated preference parameters in line with observed behaviour, e.g.
participantshave to supplypositivehours, and withsometheoreticalrequirements,
e.g.theconcavityofthe costfunction. Thisisachievedbycalibrationoftherandom
preference parameter Yo' We then simulate behaviour in the baseline situation in
order to have a well-defined reference point for comparison with post-reform
outcomes.
Two different calibration methods are applied here. Version A relies solely on
drawing,random values of Yo to bring observed and simulated behaviour in line,
whereas the extended Version B described below relies on considerations related
to the existence of fixed costs ofwork.
The motivation for taking fixed costs into account is mainly that otherwise some
individuals are predicted supplying a very small number of hours, which contra-
dicts observed behaviour (see Cogan, 1981, for a theoretical model and Bour-
guignon and Magnac, 1990, for an application). This does not appear to be a big
problem in our simulations using the model without fixed costs, but there the
fundamental asymmetry between the inclusion of fixed costs in the expenses of
baseline participants whether or not they retain that status after the reform, and
theirexclusionfor baseline non-participants remains. Yet the main advantages we
see in the fixed costs approach to calibration over simply drawing values of Yo is
that (i) the latter approach distorts preferences more, (ii) the calibratedfixed costs
onlycome into play when a womanchanges herstatus and (iii) approach B allows
us to satisfy the constraints of concavity and of compatibility between predicted
and observed baseline behaviour for a significantly larger numberof households
than does approach A.
The fixed costs are set to renderthe choice ofa low numberofhours unattractive.
Depending on the observation we allow the minimum numbers of hours to vary
between7and 14weeklyhours. Furthermorewelimitthefixedcoststoamaximum
of 10% ofthe observed expenses. These are admittedly arbitrary, yet justifiable,
5assumptions. Less than 5% of those working are observed at less than 15 weekly
hours. It is conceivable that someone with high expenses would also spend more
on fixed costs of working (choose a more comfortable travel mode, wear more
expensive clothes at work, choose more expensive day care for the children, or
po.ssibly even be charged more than less wealthy householdsfor the same service,
etc.), thus J1laking the dependency of maximum fixed costs on other expenses
seemed plausible.
2 (The details of both calibration procedures are given in
Appendix A.)
ThIs done, we simulate behaviour in the baseline situation, that is, before any
reform takes place. This provides a well-defined reference point for comparison
with post-reform outcomes.
Since we have a comprehensive definition of taxes, including social security
contributions (benefits are not accounted for here, since we model short-run
reactions and the means-tested benefits involve past incomes), and since con-
tributions are shared equally between employers and employees, it will be useful
toconsiderthe following definition ofdirect tax revenue: DTRo: = T +2C, where
T denotes taxes and C denotes employee contributions. Forthese calculations we
make use of the samplin~ weights Jil. The details of the determination of VAT
revenue are given below.
In order to determine the indirect tax revenue VATR in the reference situation,





2 It would be clearly preferable to introduce the fixed costs at the estimation stage. In dealing with'them in the
simulation while disregarding them before, we obviously create an asymmetry between the way parameters have
been estimated and the way they are used for simulation.
3 A weakness of this study is that we do not take excises into account. See SmithJ1988), Symons and Walker
(1988) and Baker et aI. (1990) for the relevance of excises in such an exercise and how they can be included. We
intend to remedy this shortcoming in future work, but also have the feeling that we address a sufficient numberof
issues in this study to be forgiven.
6where t j denotes the VAT rate on good i. The multiplicator 2 before the sum sign
is motivatedby thefollowing consideration: the directtaxreformstudiedwillonly
affect households with children. Thus, disregarding lone and unmarried parents,
the direct tax revenue consequences of this type of reform will be traced more or
le8's correctly on the sample of married couples on which our computations are
based. However, the indirecttax changes will affect the whole population, and we
make the assumption that the overall VAT revenue from households is roughly
twice the revenue from married couples and their dependents.
In order to obtain the post-reform budget line, we assume that the difference
between disposable income and expenditure on goods will remain unaffected by
the reform. Since we have not modelled saving behaviour, an assumption of this
kind is clearly needed. Using a code presented in Dagsvik et al. (1988) which
yields the disposable income Dr of the household given female hours h, we thus
compute L\: = DI - eO where eO denotes the estimate oftotal expenditure ongoods
obtained from the results of Blundell et al. (1989).
STEP 1: Simulation/or direct taxes. Given the definition of a reform which is
fully specified in its implications for direct taxes we determine the new budget
line using e!(h) =Dr!(h) - L\ for 05: h 5: Yo and simulate behaviour along this
budget line.using (8) and setting P = 1 for the first iteration. This gives chosen
hours, DTR and the corresponding sum allocated to expenditure on goods. Note
that we assume no kind of indexation of gross wages on P, which would also be
a possihility, used for France by Bloch and Maurel (1989) in a macroeconomic
exercise.
STEP2: Simulation/or indirect taxes. We suppose that the reform is defined up
toone degreeoffreedom consisting in the choice ofonetax rateand wedetermine
that residual tax rate in order to ensure revenue neutrality: VATRo+DTRo=
VATRI +DTRI. This results in a new set of prices and thus in new price indices
P and d. Steps 1 and 2 are then iterated until convergence is achieved.
74 Reform definition
The r~formsweconsiderhereconsistsincombiningdifferentdegreesofweakening
ofthe 'quotient familial' system with a version of the proposal of the European
Commission for VAT harmonization, with a low rate set at 7% and an upper rate
used as residual tax rate. Thequotientfamilial makes marginal tax rates dependent
onthedemographicstructureofthe household (supposed heretoconstituteasingle
tax unit) in the following way: the household's taxable income R is divided by a
number of 'shares' equal to the number of parents present in the household plus
half the number of children
4 and the resulting quotient Q is compared to the tax
brackets to yield a tax per share which is subsequently multiplied by the number
of shares.sThus:
T=Q f(R/Q), (20)
where qf= 2 in the baseline situation. Weakening that system is achieved by
reducing the importance of children by raising the valu~ of the parameterqf used
in the calculation ofthe shares. In this way we hope to be able to design a global
-revenue-neutral reform while keeping the residual VAT rate in the [13%, 19%]
bracket proposed by the Commission.
6 We shall report results for three values of
qf:,2, 3 and 1000, the latter approximating a complete suppression ofthe quotient
familial. In order to preserve symmetry in the definition of VAT rates before and
afterthe reform, we adopt an approximation ofthe rates forthe 16 goods included
in the studyofBlundelletal. (1989), whichisretraced in Table 1. There we denote
by r, nand m the rates of 1979 (reduced, normal and maximum) and by t the
residual rate after reform, which replaces both the normal and the maximum rate.
4 The system prevailing in 1992 is slightly more complicated, but with the data of 1979 that we use, this simple
wording isjustified.
5 Formore details see Dagsvik et al. (1988).
6 This had proveddifficult, to say the least, in the studyofBaccouche and Laisney (1990).




















































r=reduced rate; n=normal rate; m=increased rate; t =residual tax rate ensuring
revenue neutrality.
*denotes the goods categories included in the fixed costs.
5 Simulation results
Table 2 gives the residual VAT rate and the composition of tax and social con-
tributions for each of the three reforms under study. The first column describes
the baseline situation, the secondcorrespondsto the Commission'sharmonization
proposal (indirect taxes only) with labour supply and consumption adjustments
by the households. The last two columns show the effect of simult~neously
weakeningthe quotientfamilial, reducing the shareofachildfrom a halfto a third
and finally to a thousandth of the share of an adult. All results reported henceforth
take the sampling weights into account unless otherwise specified.
9We first comment on the upper panel of the table: this corresponds to version A
of the calibration, which oply relies on random drawings and does not involve
fixed costs. The first line shows the resulting residual VAT rate. A comparison of
the first two columns shows that labour supply has slightly increased.as a conse-
quence of the VAT reform, allowing a marginal drop in the residual VAT rate,
from 20.33% to 20.32%. However, both results are much higher than the rate of
18.7% obtained by Baccouche and Laisney for a reduced rate set at 8.5%.7 Such
a high reduced rate proved unfavourable to an overwhelming 98% of the house-
holds in their study. This is why we chose here to keep the reduced rate at its
baseline value of 7%. The third and fourth columns show how difficult it is to
bring the residual VAT rate within the [13%, 19%] bracket proposed by the
Commission by playing only with the parameter qf.-It appears that one would
almost have to suppress the quotient familial altogether to be able to reach that
aim, given the choice made for the reduced rate.
The next three lines give the composition of revenue under the different reforms
studied. All figures are given in milliards of 1979 Francs. The line headed 'direct
taxes' indicatesincometaxes, theline headed 'social contribution' givesemployee
contributions and the corresponding figure has to be doubled to obtain the total of
socialcontributions (employerandemployeeeachpayhalf).Thelineheaded 'VAT
revenue' reports twice the VAT revenue from the households used in the simu-
lation, according to the assumption made in Section 3. A gradual change in the
balance between direct and indirect taxation can be followed across that block of
the table.
The next block of lines shows the percentage of winners in each reform, overall
and in each of five categories of households based on the number of children. In
contrast with the study of Baccouche and Laisney, we find that a small majority
of households benefits from this implementation of the Commission's proposal,
and that the winners ar~ more numerous among households with one or two
children than among households without children or with three ormore children.
7 Baccouche and Laisney also reported a lesser rate of 16.7 when no consumption reaction of households was
allowed for, whereas the revenue neutral change to a single VAT rate yielded 12.5% with consumption reactions,
but a higher rate of 14.3% without such reactions.
10Reducing the impact of the quotient familial drastically reduces the number of
winners except in the category of couples without children, and of course in the
category of other childless households,- which is excluded from our analysis.
Table 2: Summary table for definition and impact of reforms
Version A status quo qf = 2
a qf= 3 qf=1000
Residual VAT rate 20.32 19.94 18.84
direct taxes
b 18585 18588 20118 24364
social securitycontrib.
c 17776 17778 17744 17665
VAT 64849 64842 63375 59229
percentage of winners:
overall 53.1 30.3 27.2
no children 50.5 75.4 95.4
one child 61.5 28.0 12.3
two children 54.7 10.1 4.6
three children 48.7 14.6 6.9
four children or more 29.2 22.3 16.2
Version B status quo qf = 2
a qf= 3 qf=1000
Residual VAT rate 20.32 19.93 18.82
direct taxes
b 18582 18588 20145 24374
social securitycontrib.
c 17772 17777 17746 17671
VAT 64843 64839 63342 59257
percentage ofwinners:
overall 29.2 15.6 15.5
no children 31.9 41.8 67.6
one child 39.1 16.2 4.7
two children 28.9 6.2 1.0
three children 18.8 8.4 2.3
four children or more 3.9 4.6 3.1 '
a. 20.33 without labour market reactions.
b~ milliards of 1979 Francs.
c. employee contributions only: double to obtain total contributions.
11The second panel corresponds to the calibration using fixed costs. The lines
reporting on the components of tax revenue are similar to those in the first panel.
The~differences between the entrIes for the 'Status quo in both panels come from
the differences in the resuts ofthe baseline simulation in the two approaches. Both
ar~based onthe saine'households since we use all householdsforthe computation
of tax revenue, with the only restriction that those households for which we have
been unable to satisfy either concavity or consistency between observed and
predicted behavioUr have been kept at the observed hours and expenditure con-
stellation. The only striking difference between the two panels lies in the per-
centagesofwinnersinthe differentcategoriesofhouseholds: these are muchlower
in the second panel than in the first, although the relative magnitudes are not
reversed. The comparison with the results of Baccouche and Laisney (1990) and
the advantages we see in approach B over approach A let us be more confident of
the validity ofthe results in the second panel.
Figures 1Aand 1Bshowthe conditional meansofwelfarechangesforthe different
values ofqf, plotted against the household welfare level in the simulated baseline
situation.
8 As with the tables, A indicates the basic method of calibration and B
thefixed costs approach. All results are basedonthe exponentialofthe utility level
given by equation (1). Some readers may dislike the thought of basing utility
comparisons on a measurement which includes utility for leisure. In a companion
study (Laisney et al. 1992) we report results based on utility derived from goods
only: these lead to the same qualitative conclusions. Moreover, readers who feel
ill at ease with the direct comparison of utility levels and prefers comparisons in
terms of a money metric (for caveats concerning that attitude, see e.g. Blackorby
et aI., 1991) may find some comfort in the fact that, focusing on utility derived
from goods only, our measure of utility change is proportional to the change in
supernumerary income, as equation (6) shows.
On Figures 1A and 1B it is apparent, if one disregards a few outliers at very high
orverylowlevelsofbaselinewelfare,thattheCommission'sproposal isregressive
for all household types. This regressive character is attenuated when the,quotient
familial is weakened, and in the case ofchildless households the conditional mean
gain becomes remarkably uniform. But it is also apparent that the global reform
8 The plots have been obtained with a nonnal kernel smooth with optimal variance parameter.
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does not operate a transfer from richer to poorer households, as might have been
expected from the idea that a tax relief primarily benefits households paying
substantial taxes, that is, wealthier households.
Figures. 2A and 2B provide another way to look at these results, by showing
generalized Lorenz curves, represented in terms of difference with the baseline
situation, for total utility (including leisure). The construction of these figures
ignores the sample weights used in the computation of the corresponding tables
of Appendix C, which leads to some apparent contradictions. However, the·out-
comeis thatthe Commission'sproposalonitsownistheleastunfavourablereform;
for version A of the calibration method it would even appear as preferab~e to the
status quo for all categories ofhouseholds except those withfour childrenormore
if we did not take sampling weights into account; but it is strikingly regressive,
while the others are unambiguously unfavourable, except for childless couples.
13Figure 1A: Individual welfare changes as a function of baseline welfare
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14Figure IB: Individual welfare changes as afunction ofbaseline welfare
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15Figure 2A: Generalized Lorenz q.uves
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16Figure 2B: Generalized Lorenz curves
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In this analysis of a combination of two reforms, one concerning VAT, one con-
cerning the French system of "quotient familial", we have found the latter to
function better than we had expected. This does not mean that we would consider
that system as optimal under all circumstances, but we think that the study throws
some light on the difficulty of evaluating one aspect of a tax system in isolation
from otherfeatures that mighthave to be changed along withitin afeasible global
reform.
As concerns the methodological aspects of,this study, the results are remarkably
robusttothechoiceofbasisfor utility (whetherornotleisureis takenintoaccount)
and to the choice of its measurement (total household utility, utility per head or
per consumption unit), showing that there is no need in this instance to bother
about finer concepts of equivalence scales. Moreover, the results are mostly
insensitive to the choice of approach to the calibration of the baseline situation.
One main difference, however, is that the simplercalibration approach A yields a
muchmoreoptimisticevaluationoftheCommission'sproposalthanformerstudies
orthe calibration approach B based on fixed costs do. Furthermore, the latter has
"thefollowing interesting features: (i) it distorts preferences less than approach A
does, (ii) the calibrated fixed costs only come into play when a woman changes
herstatus and (iii) approach B allows us to satisfy the constraints ofconcavityand
of compatibility between predicted and observed baseline behaviour for a sig-
nificantlyiargernumberofhouseholdsthan does approach A. Thus, inspiteofthe
increased complexity involved and in spite of the questionable arbitrary choices
it entails, we do favour the use of the calibration offixed costs.
18Appendix A. Simulation: Preliminary steps
A.i Adjustmentojerror terms
Version A: Basic model without fixed costs
We treat preferences as random through the "I parameters and draw errors terms
fromtheirestimateddistributioninordertoobtainasetofpredictionsforhousehold
behaviour in the reference situation which is consistent with the observed







where II is a stochastic component, the hours equation is:
(A 1)
(A 2)
_Concavity of the cost function requires m +w"Io > d which expresses that the
maximum possibleresources (net unearned incomeplus upperboundonthe wife's
net earnings) must exceed minimum expenditures and is equivalent with
(A 3)
At the same time, we want desired hours h:=h*+II to have the right signforeach
category, i.e. to be positive for true participants and seekers, and negative for
non-seekers.
(i) Forthetrueparticipants (h>O) we computell: =h - h*and incaseIn <!l(which
forthem is equivalentto h > "10) we 'freeze' the correspondingobservation, i.e. we
assume invariant behaviour for these households and exclude them from welfare
comparisons, retaining them only for the purpose of defining revenue-neutral
reforms'-We will treat similarly households for which the conditions below can
19not be satisfied after a given number of draws. Because m =e- wh has to be
reduced when h changes,!} in (11) appears as a function of ll. However, since
a!}/all == 1, there is nocorrective action availableforobservationsfor which!} < ll.
For the seekers (women who report zero hours but state that they are currently
lookingforwork) andforthenon-seekers (ortrue non-participants, which implies
that we disregard discouragement) we need to introduce some more notation. The
condition that Yo >h necessary for the computation of the utility level using
equation (1) reads for them:
(A 4)
Therespective positionsof!}, ~ and -h*are given bythe signofd -.m (which also
determines the sign ofthe uncompensated wage elasticity ofleisure): if d - m > 0
we have -h* < ~ <!}, and!} < ~ < -h* in the opposite case. Thus:
(ii) Forthe seekers we draw until II > max[-h*,!}1.
(iii) Forthe non-seekers we should have!} < ~ < -h*. Thus, no correction will be
possible incased - m > 0 and the household is frozen. Ifd - m < 0, we draw until
II < II < -h*.
Forthe seekersweshall assumethatthe reasonsfortheirinabilitytofind asuitable
jobremain presentafter anyrefoon, sothat theirobserved behaviouronthe labour
market is invariant. But we shall take them into account when analysing welfare
implications ofthe refoons. Forthe non-seeking non-participants we will assume
that they will be able to find a job after the refoon if they so wish.
N.B. While w is the same as in Blundell and Laisney (1989), m is recalculated
usingm=e- wh whereedenotes the estimated total expenditure ongoods. Thus
we must iterate the procedure for the true participants, possibly requiring new
drawings ofll.
20Version B: Extended model with fixed costs
For the version of the model that
accountsforfixed costsinthe caseofthe
non-seekers we only have to make sure
that ~ < 11 <-h*+h (FC), where h (FC)
denotes the number of hours that, given
her fixed costs of work and her prefer-
ences, leaves the individual indifferent e(O)






We do not intend to develop a full fixed costs model here. Instead we calculate
the fixed costs necessary to keep those women that our model predicts at ° < h < h (FC) from supplying any hours in that interval.
Looking at the above equationthe otherwayround, FC(h) are the fixed costs that
satisfy that equation for a given level of h hours. The function above is indivi-
dual-specificand sowill bethefixed costsFC necessarytorenderacertainnumber
of hours unattractive.
We choose to determine the fixed costs in such a way that, on the one hand, no
onewill be predictedworking lessthanhI =7weekly hours, and ontheotherhand,
no more thanh2=14 hours aweek will be rendered unattractive bythefixed costs.
Exceptions are made, e.g., when FC(hI ) <el10, ourupper limitforFC. Fora few
individuals the utility function is not defined at hI orh2 because ofeither ofthem
being larger than 'Yo. The procedure is then adjusted accordingly.
The difference between the two approaches is that in Version A, for some ofthe
non-seekers, we have to draw large (negative) values of 11 in order to keep them
from supplying positive hours in the simulated baseline situation. We are able to
21work with much more plausible values for 11 in Version B, the fixed costs model,
but at the same time we have to depart from the model underlying the estimation.
Yet this disadvantage should not be overemphasized, since the fixed costs only
come intoplaywhenawomanchanges herlabourmarketstatus. Inthe liimulations
wehave performed this turns out to concern a few observations only. For all the
others, the fixed costs play no role at all. Moreover, Version B allows us to keep
moreobservationsforthe welfarecoinparisons:itturnsoutthatwehave to"freezeII
46 observations for Version A but only 21 for Version B.
9
A.2 Simulation ojbaselinesituationjordirect taxes
(i).We simulate behaviour taking account of the ftill budget line in the reference
situation, using the preference parameters "10 determined in A.l, and for Version
B the fixed costs. That is, we maximize (8) along the. budget line. If predicted
behaviourcontradictsobserved behaviour, we draw new values for 11 ' largerones
for the seekers and participants, smalleronesforthe non-seekers. Forparticipants
we take the predicted hours and the corresponding predicted total expenditure as
reference and check for concavity again after reqefinition of m. Again some
iterations may be required here. This done, the preference parameters "10 (and for
Version B the fixed costs) will retain their value in the sequel.
(ii) Given the ~ and "I parameters and the optimal total expenditure on goods e
obtained together with the optimal level of hours, the predicted expenditure on
good i in the baseline situation is ei= "Ii + ~i(e - d). In case ei< 0 we replace "Ii
with "I; + 11;, where ~; = tol-e; and tal denotes some arbitrarily small number. In
ordertoleave d unchangedwe must decrease accordingly the "I coefficientsofthe
othergoods. We propose to do this in proportion ofthe f3 coefficients. In detail, if
b: = L tol-e;, thenfori E 1+we set~;=-b~/ L ~;. Here again we may have to
; e 1_ ; e 1+
iterate the procedure since some new negative expenditures may appear in the
process.Thiswillconverge providede >d (whichhasbeencheckedattheoutset).
9 In both cases this concerns non-participants with low income and few children.
22For Version B the fixed costs are allocated in proportion to the parameters ~
between six categories of goods (transport and communication, normal services,
merit services, clothing and footwear, durables and fuel, see Table 1), and modify
the corresponding "y parameters (and as a consequence the d parameter. For each
household we thus end up with two sets of "y anddparameters: the baseline setand
an alternative set which comes into play if the woman changes her labour market
status. The values of the 'minimum expenditures' become higher if a non-parti-
cipants enter~ the labour market, lower if a participant quits. In this way Version
Ballowsin principleforthe impactofchangesin relativepricesonthe participation
decision, whereas Version A does not.
23Appendix B. Infonnation on the estimated demand systems
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of shapes on which we shall not comment in detail here. Still, notice the strong
bimodal characterofthe distributionfor transport-communication: the right peak
is Gonnected with GreaterParis. In Table 3 we summarize,briefly the infonnation
on the distribution of expenditure elasticities for the four regimes which is given
in detail in Blundellet a1. (1989). Boldentriessimplyemphasize elasticitiesabove
one, and the last column reproduces the VAT rates of the baseline situation. (See
footnote to Table 1). Differences in elasticities across regimes come both from
differences in budget shares and in marginal propensities to spend. The most
striking feature is that the category books-journals is only classified as lUXurY for
the 'smoking and drinking' subsample, and that the merit services have a rather
high expenditure elasticity throughout. Health is much more a necessity for the
non-smoking and non-drinking subsample than-for the rest, which appears to be
consistent with intuition.
.25Table 3: Distribution of expenditure elasticities for the four regimes
Regime 1: alcohol and tobacco
10% Median 90% VAT rate
food 0.11 0.19 0.30 r
alcohol 0.65 0.91 1.16 n
non-alcoholic drinks 0.63 0.81 0.92 n
tobacco 0.52 0.70 0.84 m
health 0.94 1.29 2.29 r
transport-communication 0.72 0.95 1.74 (O+r)/2
normal services 0.96 1.15 1.65 n
merit service 0.92 1.24 2.52 r
lux~ 1.44 1.94 3.89 m
clothmg-footwear 0.98 1.11 1.47 n
non-durables 0.85 1.01 1.27 n
dairy products 0043 0.63 0.79 r
books-journals 1.03 1.34 1.72 r
durables 1.07 1.47 3.26 (n+m)/2
.home energy 0.25 0040 0.57 n
fuel 0041 0.64 1.48 n
Regime 2: no alcohol but tobacco
10% Median 90% VAT rate
food 0.16 0.31 0048 r
alcohol n
non-alcoholic drinks 0.59 0.81 0.93 n
tobacco 0048 0.73 0.85 m
health 0.93 1.29 2.42 r
transport-communication 0.73 0.94 1.70 (O+r)/2
normal services 0.93 1.14 1.77 n
merit service 0.90 1.19 2.95 r
lux'!!)' , 0.97 1.31 2.78 m
clothmg-footwear 0.97 1.12 1.53 ri
non-durables 0.81 1.01 1.33 n
da~ products 0043 0.64 0.82 r
boo s-journals 0.57 0.82 1.01 r
durables 1.03 1.42 3.36 (n+m)/2
home energy 0.22 0041 0.59 n
fuel 0.36 0.68 1.18 n
26Regime 3: alcohol but no tobacco
10% Median 90% VAT rate
food 0.17 0.30 0.47 r
alcohol 0.64 0.91 1.15 n
non-alcoholic drinks 0.61 0.80 0.92 n
tobacco m
health 0.92 1.25 2.28 r
transport-communication 0.72 0.94 1.67 (0+r)/2
normal services 0.97 1.17 1.74 n
merit service 0.93 1.25 2.55 r
lux~ 0.96 1.32 2.74 m
clothIng-footwear 0.99 1.12 1.55 n
non-durables 0.82 0.99 1.24 n
dairy products 0.46 0.65 0.81 r
books-journals 0.60 0.80 0.99 r
durables 1.07 1.44 3.47 (n+m)/2
home energy 0.23 0.41 0.58 n
fuel 0.40 0.66 1.19 n
Regime 4: no alcohol and no tobacco
10% Median 90% VATrate
food 0.16 0.31 0.47 r
alcohol n
non-alcoholic drinks 0.63 0.81 0.92 n
tobacco m
health 0.48 0.65 1.18 r
transport-communication 0.71 0.93 1.66 (0+r)/2
normal services 0.94 1.16 1.65 n
merit service 0.89 1.20 2.62 r
lux~ 0.97 1.26 2.36 m
clothIng-footwear 0.98 1.12 1.48 n
non-durables 0.81 1.02 1.31 n
dai~ products 0.43 0.67 0.82 r
boo s-journals 0.59 0.80 0.99 r
durables 1.04 1.39 2.98 (n+m)/2
home energy 0.24 0.42 0.59 n
fuel 0.41 0.69 1.19 n
27Appendix C. Documentation offurther results
Tables 4Aand-4B showmean and minimum welfare across situations. permitting
comparisonsfrom the utilitarian and from the Rawlsian pointofview.
10 The lower
part of each table presents measures in terms of utility per head and utility per
consumption unit, using the INSEE scale: 1for the first adult, 0.7 for the second,
and 0.4 for each child. What emerges from these tables is that the status quo is
almost always preferred. The robustness ofthis result across the basis chosen for
utility, across the measure (total household utility. utility per head or per con-
sumption unit) and for both versions of the calibration is striking. Among the
implementations of the Commission's proposal, the one that leaves the present
systemofquotientfamilial unchanged appears best, exceptfor the mean utility of
childlesshouseholds. forwhomqf = 1000 is best. ThegeneralpictureforVersions
A and B is the same. Direct comparisons of the entries is not meaningful due to
the differences in the drawings of rJ.
Tables 5Aand 5Bshow inequality indices based onthe usual isoelastic additively .
separable social welfare function, with the utility per head as argument, since this "---. '
providedthe greatestvariation. Theresultsconfirmthe visualimpressionobtained
from Figures 1 and 2: The reforms studied are regressive bothoverall and within
each ofthe household groups we have singled out, except perhaps for the group
with 4+ children. The new information here is that they all are regressive also
within the group of childless households. Furthermore the suppression of the
"quotientfamilial" does worst onthis account as well. Again, the results for both
versions arevirtuallyidenticaland differences (forthe subgroupwithfourormore
children) are only marginal.
10 Tableslabelled "A" report results ofVersion A ofthe model. The othertables, labelled "B" give results ofthe
fixed costs version.
28Table 4A: Social Welfare Levels: (i) mean
Situation status quo qf= 2 qf= 3 qf = 1000
t = 20.32 t = 19.94 t = 18.84
Utility per mean mean mean mean
household
# children: all 8.268 8.268 8.264 8.253
0 8.184 8.183 8.185 8.190
1 8.356 8.356 8.352 8.344
2 8.284 8.284 8.278 8.260
3 8.240 8.239 8.232 8.208
4+ 8.167 8.165 8.161 8.139
head count all 2.292 2.292 2.292 2.288
# children: 4+ 1.238 1.238 1.238 1.234
cons. unit all4+ 3.529 3.529 3.528 3.523
# children: 2.309 2.308 2.307 2.301
(ii) minimum
Situation status quo qf= 2 qf= 3 qf = 1000
t = 20.32 t = 19.94 t = 18.84
Utility per mean mean mean mean
household
# children: all 4.773 4.769 4.769 4.772
0 4.773 4.769 4.769 4.772
1 6.344 6.343 6.335 6.306
2 5.654 5.647 5.555 4.899
3 6.409 6.399 6.402 6.216
4+ 6.829 6.824 6.825 6.759
head count all 0.716 0.716 0.716 0.713
# children: 4+ 0.716 0.716 0.716 0.713
cons. unit all 1.507 1.506 1.507 1.502
# children: 4+ 1.507 1.506 1.507 1.502
Note: On each line, a bold (italic) entry denotes best (worst) performance
29Table 4B: Social Welfare Levels: (i) mean
Situation status quo qf= 2 qf= 3 qf = 1000
t = 20.32 t = 19.93 t = 18.82
U~i1ity per mean mean mean mean
household
# children: all 8.316 8.314 8.310 8.296
0 8.237 8.235 8.236 8.238
1 8.380 8.379 8.374 8.364
2 8.346 8.345 8.337 8.317
3 8.293 8.291 8.283 8.256
4+ 8.217 8.214 8.209 8.184
head count all 2.307 2.307 2.306 2.302
# children: 4+ 1.239 1.239 1.238 1.234
cons. unit all 3.551 3.551 3.549 3.543
# children: 4+ 2.313 2.312 2.311 2.303
(ii) minimum
Situation status quo qf= 2 qf= 3 qf=1000
t=20.32 t = 19.93 t=18.82
Utility per min min min min
household
# children: all 5.843 5.822 5.823 5.829
0 5.843 5.822 5.823 5.829
1 6.490 6.478 6.479 6.470
2 6.317 6.309 6.309 6.293
3 6.064 6.057 6.057 6.058
4+ 6.482 6.477 6.478 6.481
headcount all 0.729 0.728 0.728 0.726
# children: 4+ 0.729 0.728 0.728 0.726
cons. unit all 1.534 1.533 1.533 1.528
#.children: 4+ 1.534 1.533 1.533 1.528
30Table SA: Inequality indices
Household type fJ status quo qf= 2 qf= 3 qf = 1000
Residual tax rate
" /
t=20.32 t =19.94 t =18.84
All households 0.5 0.03137 0.03138 0.03143 0.03166
r
1 0.06146 0.06149 0.06159 0.06202
1.5 0.09025 0.09029 0.09042 0.09103
2 0.11777 0.11782 0.11797 0.11873
5 0.26208 0.26222 0.26280 0.26351
No children 0.5 0.00219 0.00221 0.00221 0.00221
1 0.00477 0.00450 0.00450 0.00449
1.5 0.00683 0.00688 0.00688 0.00687
2 0.00929 0.00935 0.00935 0.00933
5 0.02638 0.02657 0.02656 0.02652
One child 0.5 0.00160 0.00162 0.00162 0.00165
1 0.00325 0.00327 0.00329 0.00:;33
1.5 0.00493 0.00497 0.00499 0.00507
2 0.00666 0.00671 0.00674 0.00684
5 0.01791 0.01805 0.01815 0.01843
Two children 0.5 0.00158 0.00159 0.00160 0.00165
1 0.00319 0.00320 0.00323 0.00333
1.5 0.00483 0.00485 0.00489 0.00505
2 0.00650 0.00653 0.00658 0.00681
5 0.01732 0.01730 0.01747 0.01842
Three children 0.5 0.00142 0.00142 0.00142 0.00146
1 0.00284 0.00285 0.00285 0.00292
1.5 0.00427 0.00429 0.00429 0.00440
2 0.00560 0.00573 0.00574 0.00588
5 0.01443 0.01451 0.01453 0.01501
Four or more 0.5 0.00567 0.00568 0.00567 0.00569
children 1 0.01167 0.01169 0.01167 0.01171
1.5 0.01803 0.01806 0.01803 0.01808
2 0.02476 0.02480 0.02476 0.02483
5 0.07315 0.07325 0.07311 0.07329
31Table SB: Inequality indices
Household type 11 status quo qf= 2 qf= 3 qf= 1000
Residual tax rate t=20.32 t=19.93 t=18.82
All households 0.5 0.03121 0.03122 0.03127 0.03149
1 0.06129 0.06132 0.06141 0.06181
1.5 0.09023 0.09027 0.09039 0.09096
2 0.11808 0.11813 0.11827 0.11897
5 0.26805 0.26820 0.26823 0.26921
No children 0.5 0.00163 0.00165 0.00165 0.00164
1 0.00330 0.00333- 0.00332 0.00332
1.5 0.00499 0.00504 0.00503 0.00503
2 0.00672 0.00678 0.00678 0.00677
5 0.0]773 0.01789 0.01789 0.01787
One child 0.5 0.00139 0.00139 0.00140 0.00141
1 0.00280 0.00282 0.00283 0.00285
1.5 0.00424 0.00427 0.00428 0.00432
2 0.00570 0.00574 0.00576 0.00581
5 0.01504 0.01515 0.01521 0.01534
Twochildren 0.5 0.0012] 0.0012] 0.00122 0.00124
1 0.00243 0.00244 0.00245 0.00250
1.5 0.00366 0.00368 0.00369 0.00377
2 0.00491 0.00493 0.00495 0.00505
5 0.01262 0.01268 0.01274 0.01301
Three children 0.5 0.00140 0.00141 0.00141 0.00144
1 0.00282 0.00284 0.00284 0.00291
1.5 0.00426 0.00428 0.00428 0.00439
2 0.00573 0.00575 0.00575 0.00591
5 0.01498 0.01505 0.01506 0.01552
Four or more 0.5 0.00630 0.00631 0.00630 0.00630
children 1 0.01301 0.01303 0.01301 0.01300
1.5 0.02015 0.02018 0.02014 0.02013
2 0.02773 0.02777 0.02771 0.02769
5 0.08200 0.08210 0.08190 0.08179
32Table 6A: Changes in yearly hours supplied, reform qf =1000
(i) numbers of represented households
0 1-1000 1001-1500 1501-2000 >2000 total
-312 0 0 0 0 10495 10495
-260 0 0 0 0 6579 6579
-208 0 0 3432 5687 23879 32998
-156 0 0 6239 10220 54389 70848
-104 0 2259 16561 16562 131565 166947
-52 0 33027 29491 67101 321354 450973
0 1521988 51697 58514 52174 355986 2040359
52 2645 8927 2451 15376 17356 46755
104 0 0 0 3158 5964 9122
156 0 0 846 813 1232 2891
208 0 0 0 0 0 0
312 0 0 0 0 1854 1845
total 1524633 95910 117534 171091 930644 2839812
(ii) numbers of observations in sample
0 1-1000 1001-1500 1501-2000 > 2000 total
-312 0 0 0 0 4 4
-260 0 0 0 0 6 6
-208 0 0 2 2 13 17
-156 0 0 5 7 39 51
-104 0 2 14 14 84 114
-52 0 17 23 45 196 281
0 1055 35 38 34 204 1366
52 2 6 2 10 13 33
104 0 0 0 2 4 6
156 0 0 1 1 1 3
312 0 0 0 0 1 1
total 1057 60 85 115 565 1882
33Table 6B: Changes in yearly hours supplied. reform qf =1000
(i) numbers of represented households
0 1-1000 1001-1500 1501-2000 > 2000 total
--312 0 0 0 0 10495 10495
-260 0 0 0 0 6579 6579
-208 0 0 3432 5687 23879 32998
-156 0 0 6239 10220 54389 70848
-104 0 2259 16561 16562 131565 166947
-52 0 29054 29491 67101 321354 447000
0 1565167 50283 56762 52174 355986 2080372
52 2645 8927 2451 15376 17356 46755
104 0 0 0 3158 5964 9122
156 0 0 846 813 1232 2891
208 1414 0 0 0 0 1414
312 0 0 0 0 1845 1845
total 1569226 90523 115782 171091 930644 2877266
(in numbers of observations in sample
0 1-1000 1001-1500 1501-2000 >2000 total
-312 0 0 0 0 4 4
-260 0 0 0 0 6 6
-208 0 0 2 2 13 17
-156 0 0 5 7 39 51
-104 0 2 14 14 84 114
-52 0 16 23 45 196 280
0 1082 34 37 34 204 1391
52 2 6 2 10 13 33
104 0 0 0 2 4 6
156 0 0 1 1 1 3
208 1 0 0 0 0 1
312 0 0 0 1 1
total 1085 58 84 115 565 1907
34ThereisvirtuallynodifferencebetweenTable6Aand6B.Onemighthaveexpected
that with the fixed costs version there would have been fewer non-seekers sup-
plying a small number of hours. In fact there are more, and this is a consequence
of the fact that less households are 'frozen' in Version B.
Table 7 documents the fixed costs and yearly hours that leave the individual
indifferent between working and not working given the fixed costs, for the non-
seekers and for the participants. The fixed costs ofthe latter are onlyone tenth of
what they are for the former: the slope of the indifference curve at h =0 is much
steeper for the non-seekers than for the participapts (Le. higher shadow wages of
the former).
Table 7: yearly fixed costs (in FF) and h(FC)
Obs. Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev
non-seekers
fcost 984 3583 16 15146 2345
h(FC) 984 387 52 728 205
participants
fcost 824 369 8 3223 247
h(FC) 824 585 104 728 120
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